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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA DRAKE,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs.

:

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
FHP OF UTAH, and TRANSAMERICA
INSURANCE CO.,

: Case No. 940769-CA
:

Respondents.

: Priority No. 15
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Ms. Drake's accident occurred while she was on a special
errand

delivering

employer.

medical

referrals

for

the

benefit

of her

Injuries occurring both going to and coming from the

site of a special errand are compensable.

Ms. Drake had not

deviated from the scope of her special errand at the time of her
accident. The fact that she had an intent to, at some point in the
future, deviate from her special errand is irrelevant.

Under the

facts of this case, Ms. Drake was injured in extremely close
Ms. Drake7s injuries are therefore

proximity to the Ogden FHP.
compensable under Utah law.

ARGUMENT
I.

PORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OF FACTS ARE IRRELEVANT
AND INACCURATE.
The

last

sentence

of

paragraph

12

on

page

5 of

Respondent's brief is obviously irrelevant and should be completely
disregarded.

The fact that Ms. Drake was "cited for an improper

turn" is a brazen and improper attempt to introduce the alleged
fault of Ms. Drake in making a U-turn.

It is axiomatic that the

fault of an employee is an improper consideration in determining
the compensability of an accident.

Respondent is aware of this

principle, yet persists in drawing attention to this fact.
reason is clear.

The

Respondent is attempting to defer the Court's

attention away from the merits of the case and toward an assessment
of irrelevant and prejudicial facts. Petitioner, therefore, urges
this Court to disregard the last sentence of paragraph 12 on page
5 of Respondent's Brief.
II.

MS. DRAKE'S ACCIDENT IS COMPENSABLE UNDER UTAH LAW.
Respondent attempts to distinguish State Tax Commission

v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984).

The

employee in State Tax Commission was injured in an automobile
accident while driving to a two-month seminar.

Id. at 1052.

Respondent argues that the finite nature of the training program is
a distinguishing fact. However, driving every day for two months,
or for a quarter or semester in Dimmia v. Workmen's Compensation
Bd. , 495 P.2d at 439, all show that the employee's travel was
ongoing and frequent.

Despite the frequency of the travel, the

courts found injuries on the frequent special errand compensable.
Ms. Drake satisfies the factors enumerated in State Tax Commission.
The delivery of referrals was for the benefit and at the direction
of her employer.

The ability to, on occasion, leave early was
- 2 -

consideration for the delivery.

The delivery of referrals was

related to her job, although not a part of her formal job duties.
Although Ms. Drake7s journey to deliver referrals may not have been
particularly onerous or hazardous, it was inconvenient.

Id. at

1055.
Finally, Lundgerg v. Cream 0' Weber/Fed. Dairy, 465 P.2d
175 (Utah 1970) does not involve a delivery but instead an early
morning meeting that required no deviation from the employee7s
ordinary route to work.

Ms. Drake went out of her way on her way

home to deliver documents for FHP.

She had to take a different

route home which constituted a five mile deviation.

Therefore,

Lundgerg is inapplicable.
III. RESPONDENT'S OUT-OF-STATE CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE.
Respondent relies on two Florida decisions: El Vieio Arco
Iris, Inc. v. Luaces, 395 So.2d 225 (Fla. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1981),
rev.

denied,

402 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1981) and Radomski v. Great

Bicycle Shop, Inc., 464 So.2d 1346 (Fla. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1985),
Respondent does not discuss the more relevant and recent case of
Electronic Service Clinic v. Barnard, 634 So.2d 707 (Fla. App. 1
Dist. 1994).

In Electronic Service, David Barnard worked as a

television repairman in Bradenton, Florida, although he worked in
an adjoining town of Valrico. Id. 708. Mr. Barnard typically used
a company van to perform repairs and also used the van to drive to
and from work.

Id.

In addition, Mr. Barnard did not receive

compensation for overtime. Id. at 708 n.l.

On February 4, 1992,

Mr. Barnard worked an exceptionally long day. Id. Because the
- 3 -

company van had been in disrepair, Mr. Barnard drove a companyprovided rental car to and from work in addition to using the van
for deliveries.

Id. Also, a co-worker accompanied Mr. Barnard on

his jobs that day.

Id. At the end of the day, Mr. Barnard dropped

off the co-worker at the work site, rather than going directly
home, and then drove home. Id. On the way home, Mr. Barnard was
seriously injured in an automobile accident.

Id. at 709.

Mr. Barnard's employer attempted to escape liability by
arguing that "the errand ended once the claimant returned the
truck, dropped off his co-worker, and began driving home." Id. at
709.

Like FHP in the instant case, the employee attempted to rely

on the El Vieio decision.

Id. The court distinguished El Vieio,

noting that the employer has "confused the attainment of the
errand's

objective

with

the

more

completion of the errand's burden."

critical

question

of

the

Id. The court explained:

Thus, in El Vieio, the claimant was deemed to
have completed his special errand not because
the objective had been accomplished once the
supplies were purchased; indeed, one could
argue that the objective was not accomplished
until the claimant delivered the supplies to
the job site the next day. Rather, the errand
was complete at the time of the purchase
because the additional burden the errand
placed upon the claimant had been performed at
the time, and nothing remained but the
claimant's resumption of his ordinary trip
home. In the instant case by contrast, the
burden of the errand included the lengthy
round trip, and the errand could not be deemed
complete until the trip ended.
Id. at 710.
Similarly, Ms Drake's delivery of referrals was not on
her ordinary trip home.

Respondent had never disputed this fact.
- 4 -

See Respondents Statement of Facts, para. 6, ("The deviation from
Ms. Drake/s normal trip home was approximately five miles.").

It

was never disputed that Ms. Drake would take two entirely different
routes home depending on whether she was delivering the referrals.
(R. 171). The plumber's assistant in El Vieio, "merely resumed his
usual trip home that he would have made regardless of the special
errand."

Id. at 709.

In the instant case the parties do not

dispute the fact that Ms. Drake was not on her usual trip home and
also that the reason she was not on her usual trip home was because
of her delivery. (R. 171).
More importantly is the court's recognition that the
nature of a delivery involves not only dropping off the delivery
but also returning from the site of the delivery.

While the

employer's only concern is whether the delivery has been made, this
does not end the burden imposed on the employee by the delivery.
Logically, in order to deliver something, one has to leave or
return from the delivery site.

Wisely, the Florida Court of

Appeals recognized the distinction between the "attainment of the
errand's objective" versus "the more critical question of the
completion of the errand's burden."

Id. at 709.

Thus, the court

explicitly recognized that injuries incurred while leaving, as well
as travelling to, the site of a special errand are compensable.
Ms. Drake's case is analogous. Had Ms. Drake's delivery
taken place on her normal trip home, instead of requiring a five
mile deviation, then injuries occurring on her ordinary route home
would

not

be

compensable.

However,
- 5 -

as

has

already

been

established,

Ms.

Accordingly,

the

distinguishable.

Drake

was

Florida

not
cases

on

her

cited

normal
by

route home.

Respondent

are

Ms. Drake urges this Court to follow the closer

Florida case of Electronic Service Clinic v. Barnard. 634 So.2d 707
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1994).
The

remainder

of

the

out-of-state

cases

cited

by

Respondent are distinguishable. Radomski v. Great Bicycle Shop,
Inc. , 446 So.2d 1346 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1985) did not involve a
delivery of items on the way home or any deviation caused by such
a delivery.

Instead, the employee merely went to work at a

different location on his normal day off. Id. at 1346-47.

The

court observed that:
At the time of the accident, the claimant was
going home.
He was on no mission for his
employer and was doing nothing for the benefit
of his employer. He did not intend to stop in
route home for any reason for the benefit of
the employer. He was carrying some personal
tools that he owned but this was not for his
own convenience. The claimant did not intend
to work that evening at home.
Id. at 1347.
By contrast, Ms. Drake delivered documents on the way
home from work. The delivery required Ms. Drake to deviate five
miles

from

her

distinguishable.

normal

course

home.

Radomski

is

therefore

Similarly in Kammever v. Board of Education, 393

S.W.2d 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) the teacher was not delivering any
documents which required a deviation from her normal route to or
from work.

Instead, the teacher slipped and fell outside the

school on her way to an open house.
- 6 -

This situation is more

analogous to normally going to work than embarking on a special
errand. For instance, if FHP required Ms. Drake to attend an early
meeting in Salt Lake City and she was injured on the way.

These

are not the facts of the instant case.
The last two cases discussed by Respondent, Gregg v.
Dorchester County School System, 241 S.E.2d 554 (S.C. 1978) and
Evans v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 790 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.
1990) bare little resemblance to the facts presented by Ms. Drake's
case. Neither involve a delivery requiring any deviation from the
employee's normal course home.

Both were injured either on their

way to or from a meeting or place of employment, but were doing
nothing on the trip to benefit their employer.
Drake7s trip itself benefitted her employer.

Conversely, Ms.

As part of her trip

and deviation from her normal course home, she performed an
important duty on the part of her employer.
delivery of documents en route

It is this fact, the

requiring an attendant deviation,

which makes Ms. Drake7s injuries work-related.

These facts are

notably absent from every case cited by Respondent.
In addition, Respondent7s analysis of Petitioner's outof-state cases is misplaced.

While Petitioner realizes that the

special errand exception is a fact sensitive inquiry,

Petitioner

still maintains the cases cited by Petitioner are more closely
analogous. For instance, Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc. 568 P.2d
233 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) is an instance of an employee regularly
engaging in a special errand, contrary to Respondent's assertion
that compensability should be uniformly denied in such an instance.
- 7 -

In addition, the employee was injured while leaving a special
errand. Dimmia v. Workmen's Compensation Board. 495 P.2d 433 (Cal.
1972) again involved an employee injured while leaving a special
errand. Further, Respondent cites language which actually favors
compensating Ms. Drake's injuries.

The court noted that

lf

[t]he

school attendance was extraordinary in relation to Dimmig's routine
duties at Memorex."
Brief).

Id. at 439 (cited on page 18 of Respondent's

Similarlyf the delivery of referrals was extraordinary in

relation to her routine duties at FHP.
Respondent attempts to distinguish Jonas v. Lillvbad, 137
N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1965) by focusing on the fact that the activity
occurred outside normal working hours.

This reading ignores the

fact that (1) Ms. Drake's delivery often took her outside normal
working hours and; (2) that the employee in Jonas was travelling
away from the special errand. For the same reason, Respondent's
analysis of Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville, 291 S.E.2d 158
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) is misplaced.
Next Respondent addresses Charak v. Leddv, 261 N.Y.S.2d
486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) stating that:
It cannot be doubted that, had the Charak
court been faced with a situation where the
attorney had finished her responsibilities at
the court, returned to the office and then
left the office to return home, only to be
injured at that time, portal to portal
coverage would not apply.
Respondent7s Brief, page 20.
Respondent seems to suggest that the employee's injuries
were compensable because she was going to a special errand, but
- 8 -

that the injuries would not be compensable if she was leaving the
special errand.

The Charak case does not suggest such a result.

In addition, Respondent concedes that "had Ms. Drake been
injured on her way to the Ogden office, she would have been in the
course of employment, and any injury regardless of how egregious
her conduct, would likely have been covered."

Thus, Respondent

concedes the nature of Ms. Drake's journey was a special errand,
but offers the defense that because she was leaving, rather than
going to the site of the special errand, her accident is not
compensable.

There is a case authority compensating employee

injured leaving the site of a special errand. Dimmig v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board, 495 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1972) and Electronic
Service Clinic v. Barnard, 634 So.2d 707 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1994).
Finally, in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Worker's Compensation
Appeals Board, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1980)
Respondent relies on the fact that the employee worked an extra
long shift and ignores the fact that the employee was injured at
his home when he got out of his car.

However, Ms. Drake did not

make it to her driveway, she was injured in close proximity to FHP.
(R. 684)(map of area).
IV. MS. DRAKE HAD NOT, AT THE TIME OP THE ACCIDENT, DEVIATED FROM
HER BUSINESS DELIVERY.
Respondents make much of Ms. Drake's mens rea.

At the

time she was injured, Ms. Drake was planning on picking up her
children at a daycare in close proximity to her residence.

The

only thing that was not work-related about Ms. Drake's accident was
her state of mind.

Respondent chooses to focus on Ms. Drake's
- 9 -

state of mind in the hope that the actual facts of the case will be
lost. Ms. Drake was injured in close proximity to the FHP. By way
of explanation, the Ogden FHP is right off the highway 1-15.

(R.

684 map of general area) Ms. Drake submitted a map of the relevant
areas which is contained in the record.

(R. 684) .

A close

examination of the map will reveal that Ms. Drake's accident
occurred nearly adjacent to the FHP site. Further, whatever her
intention was, at the time of the accident, Ms. Drake never had the
opportunity to deviate from the delivery route. She never made it
past the surrounding area of FHP.

Therefore, under the specific

facts of this case, Ms. Drake was still within the scope of her
delivery at the time of her injury.
The
inapplicable.

portion

of

Larson

cited

by

Respondent

is

Exhibit D notes a straight line with no deviation

required of the delivery.

As has been discussed, Ms. Drake was

forced by the delivery to deviate from her normal course home. The
portion of Larson cited would apply if Ms. Drake's normal course
home was 1-15.

It was not.

Her normal course home was Mountain

Road and then down Harrison Boulevard.

Section 19.24 of Larson

does not address the fact situation presented by the instant case.
The only similar fact Respondent can point to is the fact that Ms.
Drake was leaving the site of the delivery at the time of her
accident. This problem has already been discussed and is discussed
in other, more relevant, portions of Larson. See Petitionees
Brief, p. 10-11.
Although deviations from business trips and special
- 10 -

errands do occur and are recognized at law,

Ms. Drake did not

deviate from her special errand. Ms. Drake testified that she was
injured directly outside the FHP by the highway.

(R. 172) Because

the location of the accident is important, Petitioner urges the
Court to review the map and the accident report specifying the
address of the accident.

The precise location of the accident

shows that Ms. Drake was within the scope of her special errand at
the time of the accident, notwithstanding the fact that she had an
intent at some point in the future to leave her special errand.
Such an intent is harbored by all who conduct special errands. Ms.
Drake's

home

and

her

child

care

were

in

close

proximity,

approximately five miles away from the site of the accident.

FHP

has not shown what different route Ms. Drake would have taken if
she simply had decided to go directly home rather than pick up her
children at day care.

Ms. Drake had a long way to go before she

would deviate from her route home from the special errand before
she went to pick up her children. At the time of the accident, Ms.
Drake was still within the scope of her special errand.
V.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR COVERAGE OF MS. DRAKE'S ACCIDENT.
FHP suggests that if Ms. Drake's accident is compensable,

then "any injury which may have occurred on the slopes at Sun
Valley would be covered under the worker's compensation statute."
Respondent's Brief, p.12. Ms. Drake concedes that had she taken a
trip to Sun Valley she would have deviated from her special errand.
However, Ms. Drake was not at Sun Valley when injured.

Instead,

she was within approximately one half mile away from FHP at the
- 11 -

at the time of her accident.

She had not yet had the opportunity

to deviate from her special errand. Thus, the absurd hypothetical
posed by FHP is not present in the instant case. Whether Ms. Drake
was on a special errand is a fact-specific inquiry.

Therefore,

lines will have to be drawn dependent on the specific facts
presented

by each individual case.

However, this is not a

troubling case that will open the flood-gates of claims by those
injured making special deliveries. Ms. Drake was still within the
scope of her special errand in Ogden, Utah in a location in close
proximity to FHP.
Finally, FHP had the ultimate control over its risk under
the worker's compensation statute.
operating efficiently.

FHP's shuttle system was not

Referrals were not being delivered in a

timely fashion. Rather than fix the shuttle system by hiring more
drivers or buying more vehicles, FHP chose to have Ms. Drake
deliver referrals after work.

FHP and its customers benefitted by

Ms. Drake's deliveries. By having Ms. Drake deliver referrals, FHP
exposed itself to greater liability under the worker's compensation
statute.

If FHP did not want Ms. Drake covered on her trip home,

its remedy was simple - fix the shuttle system.
this.

FHP did not do

FHP's policy argument that it should not be exposed to

liability for the actions of Ms. Drake over which it had no
control, ignores the fact that it decided to have Ms. Drake perform
these deliveries.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Drake was within the scope and course of employment
- 12 -

at the time of her accident.

Her delivery of referrals to the

Ogden FHP constitutes a special errand. Ms. Drake was still under
the burden of the special errand occasioned by the deviation the
special errand required. At the time of the accident, she had not
yet had the opportunity to deviate from the special errand.
Therefore, Ms. Drake asks that the Industrial Commission's decision
denying her claim be reversed and the ALJ's decision granting her
claim be reinstated.
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